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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 1984, President Reagan and representatives of the
People's Republic of China initialed an agreement for cooperation for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On July 23, 1985, Secretary of
Energy John S. Herrington and China's Vice Premier Li Peng signed
(321)
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the agreement.' On July 24, 1985, President Reagan sent the agree-
ment to Congress where it remained for ninety days of continuous ses-
sion before it went into effect in December, 1985.2 However, the China
Agreement generated a great deal of controversy regarding its compli-
ance with U.S. non-proliferation laws.
Secretary of State George Shultz stated that the agreement is
"good and sound, and fully consistent with all the provisions of our
law."3 Secretary Shultz also stated that the agreement with China pro-
duced significant and positive results in nuclear non-proliferation, cul-
minating in China's joining the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).4
However, some members of Congress strongly opposed the ap-
proval of the agreement. Senator John Glenn stated that "[t]he U.S.-
China agreement is seriously flawed but salvageable." Given China's
prior nuclear plant in Pakistan, 6 Senator Alan Cranston expressed his
concern with whether the agreement would be consistent with U.S.
non-proliferation and national security interests. Other Senators and
Congressmen were concerned with reports that China might be build-
ing a nuclear plant in Pakistan.'
Once again, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 was
tested. Section 123 of the AEA requires nuclear safeguards and U.S.
consent rights for the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel.8 Although the
1. The Agreement for Cooperation Between The Government of United States of
America and The Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy is provided in Appendix A.
2. In order to have prevented this agreement from going into effect, both houses of
Congress were required to disapprove of the agreement. However, this did not occur.
Omang, Nuclear Pact with China Wins Senate Approval, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1985,
A3.
3. W. H. DONNELLY, M. MARTEL, NUCLEAR ENERGY: CONGRESSIONAL CONSID-
ERATION OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH
CHINA, (1985) (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No.
IB84102) [hereinafter cited as CRS-China].
4. See id. The IAEA is an international organization established in 1956 with its
headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The purpose of the IAEA is to provide safeguards for
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. For more information on the IAEA see Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, 20 Years International Atomic Energy Agency, 1957-
1977, (1978).
5. Moffett, Closing Loopholes in U.S.-China Nuclear Pact, Christ. Sci. M., Oct.
9, 1985, at 2.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Erickson, U.S.-China Nuclear Pact has Senators Wary, J. COMM., Oct. 10,
1985, at Al.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1982). See infra note 72 for text of Section 123 of the AEA.
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1984 nuclear cooperation agreement improves U.S.-Chinese relations,
it also compromises U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals and integrity.
This note describes the nuclear policies of both China and the
United States and the interrelationship between these respective poli-
cies. The note then chronologically details the negotiation process of
the U.S.-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter
Cooperation Agreement), and the Chinese negotiating techniques. Fi-
nally, the note concludes with an analysis of the controversial articles
of the Cooperation Agreement, statutory compliance with the AEA,
and the legal and commercial implications of the Cooperation
Agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. China's Nuclear Policy
1. Developing Nuclear Capacity
A major concern of the Cooperation Agreement is the compatibil-
ity of China's nuclear policy with U.S. nuclear policy. U.S. concern
with China's development of nuclear weapons first began when plans
for nuclear weapons development were incorporated into China's sec-
ond five year plan, thus initiating the Chinese nuclear program. 9 De-
spite Mao Zedong's denouncement of the atom bomb as a "paper-ti-
ger," 10 China's nuclear program has maintained a high national
priority.11 While in the early 1950's China's nuclear program empha-
sized research, by the mid-1950's emphasis shifted to the development
of strategic weapons as part of a joint Sino-Soviet effort to develop
rocket and aviation technology. However, as their respective ideological
differences began to manifest, the termination of Soviet technical sup-
port in 1959 forced China to rely largely on its own initiative.12 China's
first success in detonating an atomic bomb came on October 16, 1964,18
9. SPECIAL HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. TRADE
INTERESTS, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (Comm. Print 99-L. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Print 99-L].
10. Shao-Chuan Leng, China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View, Occasional Pa-
pers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 1 (1984) 60, p. 1. [hereinaf-
ter cited as Leng]. The paper tiger refers to a false power.
11. Hahn, China's Nuclear History, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 29
[hereinafter cited as Hahn].
12. Id. at 28.
13. Leng, supra note 10, at 2. China became the fifth international nuclear
weapon club member by exploding an enriched uranium (U235) fission device. See
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and is attributable to a combination of a group of U.S.-trained Chinese
physicists and engineers,14 extensive indigenous uranium supplies, 5 and
enrichment capacity developed in the early 1950's. 6China's greatest
advances in nuclear technology occurred during the period of the mid-
1960's through the mid-1970's. It took China less than three years to
develop its first fusion test, and three years later, in 1967, China deto-
nated a fusion device. Since 1967, China has conducted more than
twenty nuclear tests ranging from hydrogen bombs to tactical
weapons.1
7
Throughout the 1970's China's nuclear program developed in rela-
tive isolation. The research, development, and production of nuclear
weapons took place at over forty sites in China.' 8 Principal facilities
included the Lopner test site in Xinjiang, five weapons factories, six
nuclear reactors, and two nuclear research facilities. However, key nu-
clear plants near the Sino-Soviet border were reportedly dismantled in
order to be hardened against nuclear attack.' 9
2. China's Arm's Control and Non-Proliferation Policy
In the process of developing its nuclear capability, China also con-
sidered its non-proliferation policy. China's Foreign Minister, Wu
Xueqian, called for a complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear
weapons. 20 For years the Chinese advocated total nuclear disarmament,
opposing the superpowers', efforts to limit arms control." Beijing has
denounced the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) as a "sham"
Hahn, supra note 11, at 20. China took thirty-two months compared to the U.S.S.R.'s
four years (1949-1953), England's five years, the United States' seven years, and
France's eight years (1960-1968). See also Hsieh, China's Nuclear Missile Pro-
gramme: Regional or Intercontinental, China Quarterly, no. 45, (Jan.-March 1971) at
85-91 [hereinafter cited as Hsieh]. See also Leng, supra note 10, at 2. The Chinese
test used an advanced "implosion" trigger technique rather than a less sophisticated
"gun barrel" technique. Hahn, supra note 11, at 20.
14. Hahn, supra note 11, at 20.
15. Id. Western sources have estimated China's total uranium reserves to total
800,000 tons, sufficient to run 15,000 megawatt (MW) capacity nuclear reactors for
thirty years.
16. Id.
17. See Appendix B for China's Nuclear tests.
18. See Hahn, supra note 11, at 29.
19. Id. Other plants were placed as far as thirty meters below ground level.
20. See id.
21. SHAO-CHUAN LENG, Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global Pol-
icy, in CHINA IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 165 (J. Hsiung & S. Kim eds. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as Hsiung].
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that fueled a nuclear arms race between the United States and the
U.S.S.R.21 China's current arms control policy seeks assurances from
the nuclear nation not to be the first user of nuclear arms.23 Proceeding
with its own nuclear weapons program, China's goal is to be able to
respond to hostile nuclear aggression with its own nuclear weapons.
Despite China's opposition to arms control measures sponsored by
the United States and the Soviet Union, China has participated in
other arms control matters. China has favored the establishment of nu-
clear free zones or peace zones in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, the
Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.24
China signed the Tlateloco Treaty honoring the Latin American nu-
clear free zone. Recently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated that
China's dealings with other countries, including Pakistan, concerning
nuclear technology were for peaceful purposes.25 The same Foreign
Ministry statement confirmed a nuclear cooperation agreement with
Pakistan, but denied a similar relationship with Iran. 6
Continuing with a more flexible arms control posture, China par-
ticipated in the Special Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly on Disarmament in 1978.27 The Chinese advanced a program for
total destruction of nuclear weapons and a reduction of U.S. and Soviet
conventional armaments.' 8 Yet, China also advocated that non-nuclear
states be free to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Finally, China called for a total prohibition and destruction of all
chemical, biological, and mass destruction weapons. In addition, Beij-
ing reiterated the nuclear free zone establishment, the withdrawal of all
foreign troops, the dismantlement of foreign military bases, and the su-
perpowers' restraint in the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear states.'" China also participated in the Special Ses-
22. SALT Agreement, Vol. 22 No. 22 BEIJING REv. 22-3; Mada, Waltz in Vi-
enna, Renmin Ribao, June 24, 1979, at 6.
23. See BREAK THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY, ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1-5
(1965).
24. See Hsiung, supra note 21, at 170-74.
25. Southerland, China Denies It Will Give Iran Nuclear Technology, Wash.
Post, Oct. 24, 1985, at Al.
26. Id.
27. See Leng, supra note 13, at 9. This Special Session revitalized the Disarma-
ment Commission to be composed of all U.N. members. It also replaced the Geneva
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with an enlarged committee on Dis-
armament as the negotiating body for global disarmament composed of all five nuclear
states and thirty-five non-nuclear states. See Hsiung, supra note 21, at 235-6.
28. See id.
29. SALT Agreement, supra note 22, at 17-8.
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sion of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in
1982, advancing many of the same programs as it did in 1976.30
More recently, China has become increasingly active in arms con-
trol matters. In 1980 China participated as a first time regular member
in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.3 1 China also joined the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space,32
stressing the need to prevent the militarization of outer space.3 3 During
the winter of 1983-1984, China held its first exhibition in Beijing on
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.3 ' In January, 1984, China demon-
strated its intent to become a full-fledged, internationally responsible
member of the nuclear community by joining the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
3 5
The most recent pronouncement of China's non-proliferation pol-
icy came in February, 1985 from Vice-Premier Li Peng who summa-
rized China's national and international nuclear policy as follows:
China has no intention now or in the future, of helping non-nuclear
countries develop nuclear weapons China will abide by the stipula-
tions of the IAEA and restrict nuclear cooperation with other coun-
tries to peaceful purposes only.3 6
30. See Leng, supra note 10, at I1. China's Foreign Minister Huang Hua ad-
dressed the U.N. and advanced four disarmament proposals. First, all nuclear states
should reach a non-use agreement for nuclear weapons, especially for non-nuclear
countries and nuclear free zones. Second, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should stop the devel-
opment and manufacturing of nuclear weapons reducing weapons by fifty percent.
Third, to advance conventional disarmament, all nations should not use conventional
forces for armed intervention or aggression by withdrawing troops from foreign soil
immediately. Fourth, chemical weapons and other mass destruction weapons should be
prohibited. See Vol. 25 No. 28 BEIJING REV. 11, July 12, 1982.
31. Leng, supra note 10, at 12.
32. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 101/AB13 (June 16, 1981) at 3.
33. See 90 CHINA QUARTERLY 358 (June 1982).
34. See Hahn, supra note 11, at 30.
35. Id. at 31. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. At the twenty-ninth gen-
eral conference of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on
September 23-27, 1985, Peking surprisingly announced that China would open some of
its nuclear reactors to IAEA inspectors "at an appropriate time." China's Vice-Minis-
ter of Nuclear Industry Zhou Ping also announced that China would join the IAEA
Regional Cooperative Agreement in Asia and the Pacific, the only program of its kind
operated by the IAEA. This program promotes the use of isotopes and radiation in
medicine, industry, agriculture, and other fields. See Chanda, Nuclear Cooperation,
Smoothing the Way, Sino-U.S. Pact Faces Easier Path Through Congress, Far East-
ern Econ. Rev., Oct. 17, 1985, at 25.
36. Id. Premier Zhao reiterated this policy at his famous dinner toast that covered
all aspects of U.S.-China relations. The key section reads:
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Regarding adherence to IAEA restrictions, China appears to be gravi-
tating towards a more dedicated non-proliferation policy, similar to the
policy of the United States.
B. U.S. Nuclear Policy
The U.S. policy regarding nuclear cooperation with other nations
is primarily covered by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.37 The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), 8 which amended part of the
AEA, requires among other things, that there be an agreement for nu-
clear cooperation with any other nation before private U.S. firms will
be permitted to sell sensitive nuclear technology and systems to any
other nation.3 9 The United States enacted the Non-Proliferation Act
because of threats to its security interests posed by nuclear prolifera-
tion.4 0 The purpose of the NNPA enables the United States to estab-
lish a more effective framework for international cooperation to meet
the energy needs of all nations.41 This international cooperation is nec-
essary to ensure worldwide development of peaceful nuclear uses.'1
Furthermore, the United States will take action to ensure it meets its
commitment to supply nuclear reactors to nations adhering to non-
proliferation policies.43
To implement these basic nuclear policy objectives, the United
States will actively pursue international controls over the transfer and
"We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage
in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weap-
ons." Tyler, A Few Spoken Words Sealed China Atom Pact, Wash. Post, Jan. 12,
1985, at Al, A21 col. 2.
37. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1982). For additional historical background, see C. ALLARICE & E. TRAPNELL, THE
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (1974); R. NADER, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
(1977); Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear
Power, 55 S. CAL. REv. 597 (1982); Quirk & Teresawa, Nuclear Regulation: An His-
torical Perspective, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 833 (1981).
38. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153-2160(a)(1978).
The Atomic Energy Act has been amended continually from its passage in 1946. For
an excellent and detailed survey of the revisions of the Atomic Energy Act over the
years, see generally Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the
States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
392 (1976).
39. See Print 99-L, supra note 9, at 37.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1982).
41. 22 U.S.C. § 3202 (1982).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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use of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful pur-
poses to prevent proliferation."" The U.S. policy also requires that it
meet its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations
adhering to effective non-proliferation policies by establishing proce-
dures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for export licenses
and other arrangements. Furthermore, the United States will en-
courage nations to ratify the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.45 Finally the U.S. policy requires cooperation with
foreign nations in identifying and adapting suitable technologies for en-
ergy production and the United States will also identify alternative en-
ergy options for other nations."
Although China's nuclear non-proliferation policy is becoming
more closely aligned with the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy,
China also maintains its goal of achieving nuclear parity with the
United States.
III. HISTORY OF THE U.S. - CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION
AGREEMENT
An overview of the negotiation process in the Cooperation Agree-
ment provides an account of the difficulties encountered in its formula-
tion. Interestingly, throughout the negotiations, U.S. negotiators were
sensitive to Chinese notions of sovereignty which continually overshad-
owed the negotiation process. 7 The Washington Post reported that the
Carter Administration initiated discussions concerning nuclear coopera-
tion with China, but these discussions were not pursued due to the per-
ceptions and politics so soon after relations between the United States
and the People's Republic of China were formally normalized in
1979.48 Thus, the seeds of a controversy were planted before the Rea-
gan Administration took office in January, 1981. The first two years of
44. 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1982).
45. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for Signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. A major objective
of the non-proliferation treaty is to assure nonuse of nuclear materials for nuclear
weapons manufacture. Id. art. III, para. 1. The treaty incorporates the IAEA safe-
guards to further promote these objectives. Id. art. III.
46. 22 U.S.C. § 3202 (1982).
47. For an analysis of Chinese negotiating styles in various circumstances see
Chang, Peking Negotiating Style: A Case Study of U.S.-PRC Normalization, Occa-
sional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 5 (1985) (70); L.
PYE, CHINESE COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATING STYLE (1982).
48. Tyler, A Few Spoken Words Sealed China Pact: Talks Stumbled on "Islamic
Bomb" Project, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1986, at Al.
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the Reagan Administration were clouded by the question of U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan, which China strongly opposed as infringing upon its
sovereignty. After a joint communique defused the Taiwan issue on
August 17, 1982,"0 China quickly requested the United States to assist
in developing resources for its vast rural and urban needs. The sagging
U.S. nuclear industry welcomed this demand for modernization with
enthusiasm because of drastic cutbacks in new orders for nuclear power
plants.50
The first U.S. inquiry occurred in late 1981 when U.S. diplomats
presented the Chinese with a "model" nuclear cooperation agreement.
The Chinese quickly rejected the proposal as a violation of its sover-
eignty because of its concern that any U.S. built nuclear power plant
would be subject to international "safeguards" and strict accounting
procedures designed to detect the diversion of nuclear material for the
manufacture of weapons.5 1
U.S. officials knew that it would not be feasible to sell reactors and
reactor components to China without Chinese acceptance of safe-
guards. In August, 1982, former Ambassador at Large, Vernon A.
Walter, traveled to Beijing and unsuccessfully attempted to persuade
the Chinese to accept the safeguards. 2
49. For more information on the communique see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT (L. Wolff & D. Simon eds. 1982).
50. See Tyler supra note 48, at Al.
51. The Chinese noted indignantly that China had been a nuclear-weapon site
since 1964. See id. Currently, China refuses to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-prolifera-
tion Treaty which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are both parties. The late Chinese Premier
Zhou En lai stated that it was "a great conspiracy against all peace-loving countries."
Ten years later the Chinese official news agency added. "The hegemonic practice of
prohibiting the small and medium sized countries from developing their own nuclear
weapons can deceive nobody." Id.
52. Walter's mission was overshadowed by U.S. intelligence reports stating that
China was assisting Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program. These reports indicated
the following:
(a) Chinese scientific delegations had been spending a large amount of time at a
centrifuge plant in Kahuta where Pakistani scientists were trying to produce enriched
uranium, which can be used to trigger a nuclear detonation.
(b) Pakistan scientists from a secret facility at Wah showed a nuclear weapon
design to some Chinese physicists in late 1982 or early 1983 and sought Chinese evalu-
ation of whether the design would yield a nuclear blast. The Chinese scientists con-
firmed 'that it would.
(c) The triggering mechanism for the Pakistani bomb designed appeared to be
very similar to one China used in its fourth nuclear test, suggesting that the Chinese
provided the design to Pakistan.
(d) There were also reports that China was shipping uranium to South Africa and
"Heavy water" to Argentina. China refused to answer any inquiries about its long and
1986]
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While in Beijing in early 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz
delivered a blunt message to the Chinese that the United States would
never consider entering into a nuclear cooperation agreement unless the
two countries shared the same non-proliferation principles and commit-
ments.53 In an effort to lure China into joining the majority of nations
dedicated to restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, U.S. offi-
cials dropped their safeguard demands on nuclear exports and non-
proliferation policies concerning China." Shultz then put Richard T.
Kennedy, former Army officer and former Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission member, in charge of the revised negotiations. By July, 1983 a
Chinese delegation sent to Washington announced that China would
join the IAEA.65
Kennedy, however, never sought a written policy statement regard-
ing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons from China which could have
been incorporated into the Cooperation Agreement believing that the
Chinese would never agree to a written statement as a matter of na-
tional sovereignty. Instead, U.S. negotiators, along with Kennedy, com-
municated to the Chinese that a "properly worded verbal statement" of
China's policy would be sufficient. 6  This verbal statement lead to the
controversial White House dinner toasts where Premier Zhao an-
nounced China's non-proliferation policy.6 7 Major news organizations
quickly criticized this shift in U.S. nuclear policy. 58
Kennedy's negotiating team traveled to China in mid-April, two
weeks prior to Reagan's journey, and stated that "[t]he parties will use
diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for
exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and compo-
nents subject to this agreement." 9 During the presidential trip no de-
tails were provided about the non-proliferation assurances. Only upon
trusted ally Pakistan and denied improper behavior. Id. at A20.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Chinese official had carefully studied U.S. export and nuclear control laws
believing that safeguards were not legally required on nuclear equipment sales between
two nuclear-weapon states. According to senior officials, the Reagan administration
adopted this narrow legal interpretation. See id.
57. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
58. Tyler, supra note 48, at A20. The Washington Post received a statement from
an informed Beijing diplomat that "Zhao's statement would appear unequivocally to
commit China to a non-proliferation policy consistent with U.S. interests." Neither
Washington nor Beijing disclosed the toast as the cornerstone of the emerging nuclear
cooperation agreement. Id.
59. Id.
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Reagan's return to Washington did State Department officials brief
congressional staffs concerning the negotiating history.
Congress immediately attacked the "diplomacy by dinner toast."
With reports of the continued presence of Chinese physicists in Paki-
stan's Kahuta nuclear facility, some U.S. Senators60 intensified their
attack, uncovering intelligence reports regarding Chinese aid to Paki-
stan in 1982 and 1983.61
Aware of U.S. Congressional opposition, the Chinese National
People's Congress6" ratified Zhao's non-proliferation policy by a formal
vote on May 15, 1984.63
Nevertheless, when Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping
came to Washington in June 1984, U.S. administration officials in-
formed him that Congress would not approve the accord without
China's additional non-proliferation assurances. While Secretary of
State Shultz confronted Zhang regarding the desire for assurances,
The Washington Post reported that the Chinese official had a "stormy
reaction," reiterating that there would be no further assurances and
suggesting that Shultz doubted Zhao's integrity regarding China's non-
proliferation policy when he toasted the Reagans. 4 The Chinese de-
fense minister stalked out of Shultz' office, confirming that no more
assurances were obtainable.
While U.S. intelligence continued to monitor the apparent escala-
tion of the Pakistani nuclear program,6 the proposed Cooperation
60. See infra notes 84-7, 95-8 and accompanying text.
61. Nuclear Energy Cooperation with China: Hearing Before the Special Sub-
comm. on U.S. Trade with China of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Hrg. 98-148, 106, 115, 209 (1984) [hereinafter cited as H.
Hrg. 99-1481. For a subsequent analysis of the implications of the Cooperation Agree-
ment in the United States, see also Nuclear Energy Cooperation with China: Hearing
before the Special Subcomm. on U.S. Pacific Rim Trade of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 99-59 (1985).
62. The National People's Congress is the highest decision making body in China.
See Appendix C.
63. For the Complete Text of Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang's Gov-
ernment Work Report to the National People's Congress see I Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service (FBIS), Daily Report-China, No. 107, June 1, 1984 at KI. The
Report begins as follows:
China is for disarmament and against the arms race, especially the nuclear arms
race. It stands for the complete prohibition [sic] and thorough destruction of nuclear,
chemical, biological and space weapons and for substantial reduction of conventional
weapons. . . . Id. at KI4. [Wle by no means favor nuclear proliferation by helping
other countries develop nuclear weapons. Id. at KI5.
64. See Tyler, supra note 48, at A21, col. 2.
65. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also demonstrated his apprehensiveness
1986]
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Agreement between the United States and China remained dormant
for the remainder of 1984. Additional U.S. pressure, including a per-
sonal letter from Reagan to Pakistani President Zia, induced Pakistan
to state that it would "slow" its nuclear program. In addition, the Chi-
nese removed its technicians from Kahuta.68 In June, 1985, U.S. offi-
cials again were dispatched to Beijing to assert the U.S. pledge of nu-
clear non-proliferation. Although Kennedy drafted a two-page
memorandum summarizing the non-proliferation discussion, he failed
to obtain a signature from the Chinese on the document.6 7 Kennedy
returned to Washington after receiving the new oral assurances and on
July 23, 1985, President Reagan signed the accord during Chinese
President Li Xiannian's visit.
The Cooperation Agreement went into effect in December, 1985,
subject to three provisions enacted by a joint resolution of Congress. 8
of the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear program. See Ali, Politics of Proliferation,
Zia Fails to Convince Gandhi of Good Intentions, Far Eastern Econ. Rev., Nov. 7,
1985.
66. See Tyler, supra note 48, at A21.
67. Id. at A21. Again, notions of Chinese sovereignty arose as an issue. The Chi-
nese stated that their nuclear policy was well known and had been overly repeated.
Further elaboration of their policy would ensue at their discretion. Kennedy thought
that the issue was exhaustively discussed.
68. S.J. Res. 238, Act of Dec. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-183, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (99th Stat.) 1174. The joint resolution approving the Agreement
stated: Notwithstanding section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Agreement
becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this joint resolution and other
applicable provisions of law. In relevant part the new law states:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any international agreement, no
license may be issued for export to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear
material, facilities, or components subject to the agreement, and no approval for the
transfer or retransfer to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear material, facili-
ties, or components subject to the Agreement shall be given -
(1) until the expiration of a period of thirty days continuous session of Congress
after the President has certified to the Congress that -
(A) the reciprocal arrangements made pursuant to Article 8 of the Agreement
have been designed to be effective in ensuring that any nuclear material, facilities, or
components provided under the Agreement shall be utilized solely for intended peaceful
purposes as set forth in the Agreement;
(B) the Government of the People's Republic of China has provided additional
information concerning its nuclear non-proliferation policies and that, based on this and
all other information available to the United States government, the People's Republic
of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954; and
(C) the obligation to consider favorably a request to carry out activities described
in Article 5(2) of the Agreement shall not prejudice the decision of the United States
to approve or disapprove such a request; and
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The first provision requires Presidential certification that the materials
are solely for peaceful purposes.69 In addition, a second provision re-
quires the President to certify reprocessing requests not prejudicing the
decision of the United States to approve or disapprove such a request. °
Finally, the third provision requires the President to submit to Congress
an unclassified report with classified addendum "detailing the history
and current developments in the non-proliferation policies and practices
of China" in order to obtain an export license or approval for transfer
or retransfer of nuclear material.7 '
Thus, the U.S. perception that China would refuse to accept con-
crete non-proliferation standards resulted in the United States settling
for less restrictive standards in its Cooperation Agreement with the
Chinese. Continued notions and assertions of Chinese sovereignty ap-
parently prevented the United States from obtaining more elaborate
assurances.
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY COMPLIANCE FOR A NUCLEAR
COOPERATION AGREEMENT
A. Section 123 Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are subject to close congres-
sional scrutiny concerning its statutory compliance with the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. The nine statutory requirements which
must be fulfilled under Section 123 of the AEA of 1954 for new coop-
eration agreements include: 2
(2) until the President has submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the chairman of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
detailing the history and current developments in the non-proliferation policies and
practices of the People's Republic of China.
The report described in paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form with
a classified addendum.
(c) Each proposed export pursuant to the Agreement shall be subject to United
States laws and regulations in effect at the time of each such export.
(d) Nothing in the Agreement or this joint resolution may be construed as provid-
ing a precedent or other basis for the negotiation or renegotiation of any other agree-
ment for nuclear cooperation .... Id.
69. Id. art. (b)(l)(A).
70. Id. art. (b)(1)(C).
71. Id. art. (b)(l)(2).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1982). Section 123 of the AEA as amended requires:
(1) a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth in the agree-
ment for cooperation will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and
equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material
used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long
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1) Safeguards and their durability,
as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperat-
ing party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement whether the
agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason;
(2) in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a condition of con-
tinued United States nuclear supply under the agreement for cooperation, that IAEA
safeguards be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere;
(3) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 2121(c) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nuclear;
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to be transferred pursuant to
such agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of any nu-
clear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to
such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or
development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose;
(4) except in the case of those agreements for cooperation arranged to section
2121(c) of this title and agreements for cooperation with nuclear-weapon states, a stip-
ulation that the United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear
materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear material
produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive
device or terminates or abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;
(5) a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data
transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and except in the case of agree-
ments arranged pursuant to section 2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c), of this title, any
production or utilization facility transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the ju-
risdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of the United States;
(6) a guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical security will be
maintained with respect any nuclear material transferred pursuant to such agreement
and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of
any material, production facility, utilization facility transferred pursuant to such
agreement;
(7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section
2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no
material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in
or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility
transferred pursuant to the cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the pluto-
nium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope
235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered in form
or content without the prior approval of the United States;
(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section
2121(c), 2164(b), or 2164(c) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that no
plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in
the isotope 235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered
from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or special
nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursu-
ant to the agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been
approved in advance by the United States; and
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2) Scope of safeguards,
3) No military or explosive use,
4) Right of return,
5) Retransfer,
6) Physical security,
7) Reprocessing, enrichment or other alterations,
8) Storage, and
9) Sensitive nuclear technology.
Two provisions, Articles 5 and 8, of the Cooperation Agreement have
been criticized for not complying with § 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Article 5 of the Agreement considers U.S. consent rights for the
reprocessing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel and Article 8 of this Agree-
ment considers nuclear safeguards.
1. Article 5
Article 5, paragraph 1, requires the parties' agreement for the re-
transfer of materials, facilities, components, or special nuclear materi-
als pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement.7 3 Paragraph 2 specifies
that neither party has any plans to enrich to twenty percent or greater,
reprocess, or alter in form or content, material transferred pursuant to
the Agreement.7 In addition, Article 5 requires that neither party has
any plans to change locations for the storage of plutonium, uranium
233 (except as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or highly en-
riched uranium transferred pursuant to the Agreement. If these pur-
suits materialize, the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree,
within six months, on a mutually acceptable arrangement regarding
long term arrangements for such activities.7 5 The parties shall under-
take these obligations "favorably," and agree to provide pertinent infor-
mation on the plans.7 6 During this six month period, the parties agree
not to act. If a long term agreement is not reached during this time, the
parties will promptly consult for the purpose of agreeing on interim
measures. Both parties agree to refrain from actions which either party
(9) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to section
2121(c), 2164(b), 2164(c) of this title, a guaranty by the cooperating party that any
special nuclear material production facility, or utilization facility produced or con-
structed under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any
sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation
will be subject to all the requirements specified in this subsection.
73. See Appendix A, art. 5(1); 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1, 4 (Sept. 1985).
74. See Appendix A, art. 5(2); 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1, 4 (Sept. 1985).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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believes would prejudice the long-term arrangements or adversely af-
fect the cooperation under the Agreement. 7 7 These consultations will be
conducted promptly and not inhibit the legitimate development and ex-
ploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.7 8
Finally, the third paragraph of Article 5 precludes the use of ma-
terial, facilities, or components for any explosive device. The article
further prohibits research specifically for the development of any nu-
clear explosive device or for any military purpose.79
a. Proponents
The proponents of the Cooperation Agreement assert that Article
5(1) of the Agreement satisfies the retransfer criteria of the Atomic
Energy Act § 123(5) because no material, facilities, components, or
special nuclear material transferred pursuant to the Cooperation
Agreement can be retransferred unless the parties agree.8
Furthermore, the proponents of the Cooperation Agreement assert
that Article 5(2) satisfies §123(7) and § 123(8) of the AEA concerning
reprocessing, enrichment, or other alterations and storage. The first
sentence in Article 5(2) prohibits activities in § 123(7).81 China's con-
sideration of reprocessing, enrichment, or other alterations requires
that the parties' consult and consider such activities favorably, and that
during this consultation period, no reprocessing, enrichment, or altera-
tion shall be conducted. If no long term arrangements are made within
six months, interim measures shall be discussed. Proponents maintain
77. Id.
78. See Appendix A, art. 5(2); 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (Sept. 1985).
79. See Appendix A, art. 5(3); 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (Sept. 1985).
80. H.R. Doc. No. 99-86, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 34 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. Doc. 99-86]. (Statement of Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the Arms control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)). (Statement of Richard T. Kennedy, Ambassador
at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Non-Proliferation Policy and
Nuclear Energy Affairs). Section 109 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that prior
U.S. approval for retransferring any components, items, and substances exported from
the United States which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has determined
to be "significant for nuclear explosive purposes." These components, items, and sub-
stances are defined in 10 C.F.R. Part 110. See also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U. S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 729, U.S.- CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT 32-
3 (1985).
81. H.R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 36. See United States-People's Republic
of China Nuclear Agreement: Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg.
99-339, 99th Cong., ist Sess. 181 (1985) [hereinafter cited as S. Hrg. 99-339] (state-
ment of Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
82. H.R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 37.
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that these provisions clearly preclude China from unilaterally proceed-
ing with reprocessing, enrichment, or alteration in the face of U.S.
objection.
Finally, proponents of the Cooperation Agreement assert that Ar-
ticle 5(3) satisfies § 123(3) of the AEA which prohibits military or
explosive use. 83
b. Opponents
A major criticism of Article 5 involves the statutorily required
U.S. consent rights. Critics assert that the parties' agreement to "favor-
ably hold consultations" on future arrangements is an insufficient provi-
sion if China should aspire to separate plutonium from spent fuel.84
Opponents have argued that the Cooperation Agreement's mere provi-
sion for a commitment to hold consultations is insufficient, and they
have maintained that the Agreement should have provided for presi-
dential certification and verification of the U.S. consent rights. 85 The
primary concern is to have a clear and unambiguous understanding
that the United States possesses veto rights over China's reprocessing
of U.S. spent fuel used to extract bomb-usable plutonium.8 ' Finally,
critics assert that mere "future consultations" enable China to store
large amounts of spent fuel, ready for reprocessing, which would create
a difficult situation for obtaining a U.S. veto.87
2. Article 8
The other controversial article of the Agreement is Article 8 which
provides that the parties shall consult, at the request of either party, on
matters regarding the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement,
the development of further nuclear cooperation, and other related mat-
ters of mutual concern. 88
The second paragraph of Article 8 specifies that bilateral safe-
guards are not required because the Agreement is between two nuclear-
83. H.R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 33, 51. (statements of John C. Whitehead,
John S. Herrington, Secretary of Energy).
84. See S. Hrg. 99-339 supra note 81, at 5 (statement of Senator John Glenn).
85. See S. Hrg. 99-339 supra note 81, at 48 (statement of Senator John Glenn).
Senator Glenn introduced legislation entitled "The Sino-American Nuclear Verification
Act of 1985" that would secure many of the concerns he raised.
86. See S. Hrg. 99-339 supra note 81, at 54 (statement of Senator William
Proxmire).
87. Id.
88. See Appendix A art. 8(1); 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5, art. 8(1) (Sept. 1985).
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weapon states. However, the parties will use diplomatic channels to es-
tablish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of informa-
tion, and visits in order to exchange experiences and strengthen techni-
cal cooperation between the parties. These visits further ensure that the
provisions of the Cooperation Agreement are effectively carried out,
and enhance a stable, reliable, and predictable nuclear cooperation re-
lationship in connection with transfers of material, facilities, and com-
ponents under the Agreement.89
The final paragraph requires that the parties exchange views and
information on the establishment and operation of their respective na-
tional accounting and control systems for sources and special nuclear
material subject to the Agreement.90
a. Proponents
Proponents of the Cooperation Agreement contend that the scope
of the safeguards required under § 123(1) are satisfied by giving the
United States the right to conduct visits,9 ' the purpose being to ensure
that the provisions of the Agreement are effectively carried out. Fur-
thermore, the visits must be arranged "in connection with transfers" of
items under the Agreement. Thus, these visits should establish mutu-
ally acceptable arrangements, as well as consultations and exchanges of
information on national accounting and control systems, as required by
§ 123(1). 91 Proponents argue that the safeguard provisions in the Chi-
nese Cooperation Agreement are similar to safeguard provisions in
agreements that the United States has with the United Kingdom,
Belgium, Greece, and thirty-two other countries." Furthermore, the
legislative history does not require more restrictive standards. 9"
b. Opponents
However, opponents of the Cooperation Agreement have criticized
the Agreement for its opaque language regarding the adequate verifica-
89. See Appendix A, art. 8(2).
90. Id., art. 8(3).
91. H.R. Doe. 99-86, supra note 80, at 32. The proponents state that because
China is a nuclear weapon state the requirement for IAEA safeguards set forth in §
123(2) are inapplicable. Id. at 31.
92. H.R. Doe. 99-86, supra note 80, at 33 (statement of Kenneth L. Adelman,
Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
93. See S. Hrg. 99-339 supra note 81, at 192-99 (1985) (statement of Michael J.
Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
94. Id.
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tion and IAEA safeguards for the peaceful uses of U.S.-exported
materials to China. The safeguards "usually involve a thorough ac-
counting and monitoring system" for U.S. exports. 95 Article 8 of the
Cooperation Agreement states that the parties will use "diplomatic
channels" to discuss future arrangements pertaining to safeguards
rather than establishing such diplomatic channels. 9" Without safeguard
guarantees in the Chinese Cooperation Agreement, opponents stress
that the United States is setting a dangerous precedent concerning
safeguard requirements which it would want to secure in future cooper-
ation agreements.
Opponents have cited Chinese nuclear agreements with Argentina,
Brazil, and Japan in which all of these agreements required IAEA
safeguards,9 7 and opponents have further pointed out that while these
countries secured safeguards with China while the United States has
only obtained vague visitation rights from China. 98
The language of both Article 5 and Article 8 could have been
more precise. The fact that China agreed to IAEA safeguards with
other nations entering into similar nuclear agreements further strength-
ens the opposition's assertions that the United States also should have
secured the IAEA safeguards.
3. Procedural Compliance and Congressional Review
Statutorily mandated congressional review provided the forum for
congressional scrutiny of the Cooperation Agreement. President Rea-
gan approved the Export Administration Act Extension99 on July 12,
1985, in order to restore some of the congressional authority concerning
nuclear cooperation agreements which has been struck down in Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.10 0 If an agreement in-
95. See id. at 51 (statement of Senator William Proxmire).
96. See id. at 2, 3 (statement of Senator John Glenn).
97. Id. at 4, 53. China signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil on
November 11, 1984, Argentina on April 16, 1985, and Japan on July 31, 1985. CRS-
China supra note 3, at 12, 13, 15. China also entered into agreements with France in
March, 1982 and the United Kingdom on June 3, 1985. Id. at 13, 17. Xinhua wire
service reported that China and the Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement
on February 25, 1986 (available February 28, 1986 on LEXIS/NEXIS, Nexis library,
wires file).
98. S. Hrg. 99-339 supra note 81, at 53 (statement of Senator William Proxmire).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2159(b) to (f) (1982).
100. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
The U. S. Supreme Court in Chadha declared that a House Committee resolution
authorized under 1254(c)(2) of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality, invalidating an Execu-
tive Branch action was unconstitutional. This decision abolished the legislative veto
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cludes exemptions' 01 to the statutory requirements of § 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the proposed agreement may not take ef-
fect until approved by a joint resolution of Congress.
If an agreement contains no exemptions to § 123, the President
submits it to Congress for a period of ninety working days which in-
cludes thirty days of consultation by the. House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,'"2 and sixty days
of congressional review.103 The committees must conduct hearings con-
cerning whether the agreement should be approved or disapproved.
During the thirty day review, should one of the committees decide that
an exemption to § 123 is required, Congress "expects that the President
will submit the exemption."'" 4 The President may then either request
an exemption or renegotiate the agreement. 05
Although never exercising the option, 0 6 it is also possible for ei-
ther the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs to petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the Department of Defense and request that
those departments furnish their views as to whether the safeguards and
other controls provide an adequate framework to ensure that any U.S.
exports will not be inimical or create an unreasonable risk to U.S. de-
fense and security. 107
The procedural requirement for congressional scrutiny of the Co-
operation Agreement was fulfilled. The first thirty days of review ex-
pired without any legal objection. 10 8 In the following sixty days of re-
view, a joint resolution was adopted before the Agreement went into
effect in December, 1985.109
over executive actions. Id.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a) (1982).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2153(c) (1982).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1982).
104. 131 CONG. REC. H4919-20 (daily ed. June 26, 1985).
105. "It is clear that this provision does require the President to act in good faith
for if he overrides Congress' recommendation during the thirty day review period, we
cannot force him to comply." 131 CONG. REc., S8925 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (state-
ment of Senator William Proxmire).
106. CRS-China supra note 3, at 3.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2121, 2164 (1982).
108. Chanda, Nuclear Cooperation, Smoothing the Way, Sino-U.S. Pact Faces
Easier Path Through Congress, Far Eastern Econ. Rev., Oct. 17, 1985, at 25.
109. S. J. Res. 238, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See supra note 68.
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B. Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 1 0
Because of China's suspicious nuclear cooperation with other
countries, Section 129 of the AEA was invoked to allow further con-
gressional scrutiny of the Cooperation Agreement. According to Sec-
tion 129, exports of nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nu-
clear technology are prohibited to any nation that the President finds to
have, subsequent to 1978,
• . . assisted, encouraged or induced any non-nuclear weapon state
to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear material
and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of
nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the
President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminat-
ing such assistance, encouragement or inducement."'
The President may waive this export prohibition if he determines that
the prohibition would seriously prejudice United States non-prolifera-
tion goals or jeopardize the common defense or security of the United
States. 1 2 Thus, the President still retains discretionary powers should
China manifest nuclear proliferation behavior contrary to U.S. non-
proliferation policies.113
V. SUBSEQUENT MEASURES
A. Judicial Intervention - Cranston v. Reagan
Because the Cooperation Agreement successfully survived the con-
gressional scrutiny without a joint resolution veto, successful subse-
quent judicial measures to nullify the Cooperation Agreement appear
unlikely. In Cranston v. Reagan"4 three congressional members' 1 ' and
six public interest organizations' 6 alleged an Atomic Energy Act viola-
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2158 (1982).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2158(2)(B) (1982).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2158(2) (1982).
113. President Carter invoked this privilege during the Tarapur incident. See in-
fra note 124 and accompanying text.
114. Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.C.D.C. 1985).
115. The plaintiffs were Senator Alan Cranston, member of the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, and United States Representatives Howard E. Wolpe, and
Michael D. Barnes, members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Id. at 247
n.l.
116. The organizational plaintiffs were: the Nuclear Control Institute, the Union
of Concerned Scientists, Greenpeace, U.S.A., the Natural Resources Defense Council,
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tion against several executive branch members"1 7 concerning agree-
ments for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Swe-
den1 18 and Norway." 9 The plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction
requiring the U. S. Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy to
review, subject to the agreements for pirposes of reprocessing, all
transfers from Sweden and Norway of spent reactor fuel. 20 The de-
fendants moved to dismiss asserting that the case presented a non-justi-
ciable political question because United States nuclear non-prolifera-
tion policy and foreign relations matters were best left to the political
branches of government. 2' The court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the case, holding that the case presented a non-justiciable
political question.12 Thus, it would seem that the statutory scheme of
the Cooperation Agreement with China would also qualify as a non-
justiciable political question. As in Cranston v. Reagan, the issue of
consent rights to reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel also arose in the
Chinese Cooperation Agreement. Again, because of the foreign policy
considerations and the subsequent restrictions placed on the Chinese
Cooperation Agreement, 23 subsequent judicial intervention appears
unlikely.
Inc., the Energy Research Foundation, and Greenpeace, Sweden. Id. at 247 n.2.
117. The defendants included United States President Ronald W. Reagan, United
States Secretary of State George P. Shultz, United States Secretary of Energy Donald
P. Hodel, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Ken-
neth L. Adelman, and the Chairman and members of the United States Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission. Id. at 247 n. 3.
118. The precise name of the treaty is "Agreement for Cooperation between the
United States of American and Sweden Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy."
Id. at 247.
119. "Revised Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America
and Norway Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy." Id.
120. The plaintiffs contented that 4 U.S.C. §§ 2153-2160 were violated because
terms to retransfer and reprocess spent nuclear reactor fuel must be made subsequent
to the initial cooperation agreements. The Norwegian and Swedish agreements for co-
operation permitted them to retransfer spent fuel throughout the thirty year life of the
agreements. Id. at 250.
121. Id. at 248, 252. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs were without
standing to sue and that congress intended to preclude judicial review of nuclear coop-
eration agreements.
122. Id. at 254. The court did not address the defendant's other issues regarding
standing and statutory preclusion of judicial review. Assuming that the Congressional
plaintiffs did have standing, the court would have denied the requested relief exercising
remedial discretion. Id. Moreover, although the court held that the legal issues did fall
within the court's province to decide, they were nonjusticiable. Id. at 247.
123. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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B. Legislative and Executive Intervention - U.S. v. India Case
Prior U. S. experience, however, demonstrates that subsequent leg-
islative or executive measures are likely if it appears that China intends
to violate the terms of the Agreement. The United States concluded a
nuclear agreement with India on October 25, 1963, in which the
United States was to supply all of the enriched uranium needed for fuel
at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. 12 4 Article VI of this agreement
enumerated safeguards to ensure that U.S.-provided nuclear fuel or
technology supplied to India would be used for peaceful purposes.12
On May 18, 1974, India conducted an underground test of a nuclear
explosive device.1 26 The Nixon Administration temporarily suspended
nuclear exports for Tarapur until India assured the United States that
United States nuclear materials would be used only for the Tarapur
Station, thereby precluding their use for nuclear explosive purposes.1
Congressional concern lead to eleven bills dealing with non-prolifera-
tion policy during the 95th Congress, culminating in the passage of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978.128 To implement the
NNPA's goals, Congress mandated that statutory standards be met
before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would be allowed
to issue export licenses.129 The NCR denied the issuance of licenses for
exports to India on May 16, 1980 after two unsuccessful applica-
tions.1 30 However, President Carter vetoed the NRC's decision by
utilizing an executive order that authorized the exports to India."'
Carter argued that if the United States withheld the nuclear fuel ex-
ports, India might claim that the United States had breached its con-
tractual obligations, thus freeing India of its corresponding obligation
124. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,
Aug. 8, 1963, United States-India, Art. II, para. A, 14 U.S.T. 1484, T.I.A.S. 5446.
125. Id. art. VI.
126. See Schorr, Testing Statutory Criterion for Foreign Policy: The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Export of Nuclear Fuel to India, 14 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 419, 426 (1982). See also Moeller, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Ex-
port of Nuclear Fuel to India-Exec. Order No. 12218, 45 Fed. Reg 41625 (1980), 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 227 (1981).
127. W. H. DONNELLY, D. S. KRAMER, NUCLEAR EXPORTS: LICENSING FUEL FOR
INDIA'S TARAPUR NUCLEAR POWERPLANT 3 (Library of Congress, Congressional Re-
search Service Issue Brief No. IB78043), (1980). See N. Y. Times, May 23, 1974 at
Al, col. 4.
128. Schorr, supra note 126, at 427 n. 37.
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156, 2157 (1982).
130. Schorr, supra note 126, at 434-5.
131. Id. at 447.
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not to reprocess U.S.-supplied fuel.132 Moreover, Carter asserted that
India might not abide by U.S. vetoes over the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial to a third country.13 3 In addition, suspending fuel to India might
move India to withdraw Tarapur from IAEA inspections. Carter stated
that continuing these exports would maintain a dialogue with India es-
sential to U.S. non-proliferation policies.1 34
The Cooperation Agreement with Chifia raises several potential
concerns similar to those encountered during the Tarapur incident. In
the Tarapur incident the United States continued to supply nuclear
fuel to India because of foreign policy considerations. Should China
invoke its own interpretations of the Cooperation Agreement, foreign
policy considerations similar to those faced by the United States during
the Tarapur incident may again place the United States in a difficult
and precarious position.
VI. COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS
A. China's Civil Nuclear Program and Energy Market
Not only do non-proliferation and foreign policy issues emerge
from the Cooperation Agreement, but substantial commercial implica-
tions become evident. In light of China's overall energy market, its civil
nuclear program has become increasingly important to its development
and modernization efforts. Recently, China has begun to develop an
ambitious nuclear energy program for the installation of nuclear energy
power by the year 2000.'11 The construction of nuclear power plants in
energy deficient areas would help China attain its goal of doubling en-
ergy output and efficiency, which are both a necessary components for
Chinese development and modernization. Although China is faced with
severe electrical power shortages which have adversely affected indus-
trial production, it still must obtain increased electrical power for fu-
ture industrial and economic growth.
China has relied primarily on coal-generated energy, especially in
132. Id. at 448.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 449-50.
135. H. R. Doc. No. 99-86, supra note 80, at 24. By the year 2000, China expects
to quadruple the value of its industrial and agricultural products currently at U.S. $350
billion. Print 99-L, supra note 9, at 34. The energy demand would quadruple from
62,000 megawatts (MW) to 250,000 MW. The projected energy source mix would
consist of twenty-five percent from fossil fuel, twenty percent from hydropower, and
five percent from nuclear. Current plans call for ten to twelve reactors providing 10,000
MW. Id.
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the rich fossil fuel areas of northern and central China. 36 Coal cur-
rently represents seventy-four percent of China's energy production .
37
Coal-generated energy has become more costly because of the growing
demands for coal, especially in the transportation and railroad
industries.
Petroleum usage in China has fallen, 13 8 yet the output of petro-
leum has remained constant since 1978.139 Petroleum now accounts for
twenty percent of China's energy supply, down from twenty-four per-
cent in 1978.1'0 Growing internal demands for oil may force China to
reconsider its oil export policy which accounts for twenty-five percent
of current export earnings. 41
Hydroelectric power also provides energy for China. However, the
large dams required to expand the use of hydroelectric power are re-
garded as a costly and overly taxing loss on valuable agricultural
land..1 12
Natural gas production is limited to only one basin in Sichuan as a
by-product of the major oil fields.'4 3 Because of severe undercapitaliza-
tion, especially in exploration, natural gas production has declined
significantly.""'
Because of these perceived energy requirements and conditions,
China has accepted nuclear power as an alternative. China will need to
balance the costs of implementing foreign technological assistance to
construct nuclear installations against its tradition of self-reliance.
China has adopted a dual strategy: importing nuclear technology for
large plants, but designing and building smaller indigenous plants.' 4" It
is estimated that China possesses uranium deposits sufficient to main-
tain this civil nuclear program, 46 and American industries aspire to
accommodate China's expected demand for American nuclear products
136. H. R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 24.
137. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Technology Trans-
fer to China-A Technical Memorandum, (Washington, D.C. U.S. Gov. Printing Off.,
Sept. 1985, p. 20 [hereinafter cited as OAT].
138. See H.R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 24.
139. Id.
140. This situation has developed largely because of lack of exploration. See
OAT, supra note 137, at 19.
141. See H. R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 24.
142. Id. There are eighteen large hydropower stations and eleven under construc-
tion for completion in the year 1990.
143. See OAT, supra note 137, at 19.
144. Id.
145. Print 99-L, supra note 9, at 34.
146. See H. R. Doc. 99-86, supra note 80, at 25.
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and related services.
1. Market Potential
The potential impact of the Cooperation Agreement on U. S. in-
dustries may be significant. In a hearing before the House Energy and
Commerce Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China, several
U.S. companies testified regarding their respective needs for doing bus-
iness with China in order to remain in business themselves.14 7 If China
imports each of the planned ten nuclear reactors, the total cost to
China has been estimated at $20 billion, consisting primarily of nuclear
components and services. s Westinghouse has estimated that between
six to seven billion dollars out of China's $20 billion budget allocated
for nuclear power plants will be contracted out to foreign contribu-
tors. "1 9 General Electric estimated that the U.S. industry could enjoy
$10 billion of exports over the next five to ten years. 50 The American
Nuclear Society estimated that the Chinese nuclear program could pro-
vide jobs for approximately 20,000 to 50,000 workers outside of China
over the next ten to fifteen years.' 5 ' Additionally, future contracts in
associated areas for technical assistance, replacement parts, transmis-
sion and distribution systems, lighting, and factory installations could
also produce large revenues.
With no new projected nuclear orders from Japan, West Germany,
France, Great Britain, or the United States, the nuclear industry faces
intense competition for the Chinese market. 52 Thus, the Cooperation
Agreement is crucial to the vitality of the American nuclear industry.
147. H. Hrg. 98-148, supra note 61. See also CRS-China supra note 3, at 3-4.
148. Print 99-L, supra note 9, at 34. The nuclear component of a large power
plant is about fifteen to twenty percent of the total cost. Id. Much of the $20 billion
would derive from site preparations and in local civil engineering and construction. Id.
at 35.
149. H. Hrg. 98-148, supra note 61, at 4.
150. Id. at 56.
151. See CRS supra note 3, at CRS-3. Westinghouse estimates that each reactor
sale will provide 5,000 jobs in thirty-five states and $1 billion in revenues over five or
six years. Print 99-L, supra note 9, at 37.
152. H. Hrg. 98-148, supra note 61, at 4, 42, 44, 70. See also Print 99-L, supra
note 9, at 36. For details concerning non-U.S. nuclear suppliers General Electric Co. of
Great Britain and Framatone of France, see do Rosario, Peking gets its way, China's
Daya Bay nuclear plant is all set to go ahead, Far Eastern Econ. Rev., Jan. 23, 1986;
Matthews, Nuclear Power Shapes Up, But will the opportunities be as large as ex-
pected? CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 26.
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2. Financing Potential
In addition to the commercial implications, the required financing
of China's nuclear power plants raises another issue. The Chinese are
unlikely to finance the nuclear power plants through borrowing; they
plan to finance through excess foreign exchange reserves. 153 If China's
foreign exchange reserves fail to supply the necessary currency to fi-
nance the nuclear power plants, China may be forced to borrow the
necessary funds, thus providing U.S. banks with opportunities to fi-
nance the transactions. Often, nuclear power plants require at least
eight years of construction and another twelve to fifteen years for re-
payment of the financing loans. 154 In addition to possibly borrowing
funds from the United States, China has several other options for fi-
nancing its nuclear needs. It may consider utilizing official Government
supported export credit, using credit entirely from Export-Import Bank
(Eximbank), or Eximbank combined with private credit sources. 15 An-
other option available is to arrange complete private financing with an
Exim guarantee. China may also utilize foreign currency swaps.1 6
The large commercial and financing possibilities are of genuine
concern and interest for the American nuclear industry and U.S. econ-
omy. Potential arrangements with China may also improve the U.S.
trade deficit problems. The financial implications of the Cooperation
Agreement, which undoubtedly played a key role in the passage of the
Agreement, may prove to be as significant as the Agreement's non-
proliferation goals.
VII. CONCLUSION
The controversial Nuclear Cooperation Agreement illuminates the
153. China has cancelled its plant to purchase two nuclear power plants valued at
about $2 billion after months of foreign contract bidding. The decision to abort the
plan was because of foreign currency and capital reserve shortages in China. China has
manifested their intent to finance the nuclear power plants strictly through the use of
reserves which also casts doubts as to U.S. financial market involvement. See Gumbel,
Peking Drops Plans to Purchase Nuclear Plants, Siemens Unit Says, Wall Street J.,
Mar. 4, 1986, at 35.
154. See S. Hrg. 99-339, supra note 81, at 163 (statement of Raymond J. Al-
bright, Vice President-Asia, Export-Import Bank of the United States).
155. Id. at 164.
156. Id. A currency swap allows a borrower to exchange its export credit in dol-
lars with a private bank credit to another borrower in yen, or other low interest rate
currency. So-called low interest rate currencies include the Japanese yen and Swiss
franc markets with fixed market interest rates below 7.5 percent for eight to ten years.
The dollar rates are fixed at 11 to 13 percent at the time of this hearing.
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difficulties of balancing non-proliferation objectives with foreign policy
and commercial goals. The Chinese Agreement has enhanced United
States-Sino relations because of U.S. cooperative efforts. The U.S. is
now able to exercise greater influence over China's nuclear policy, with
the result of strengthening U.S. non-proliferation policies through con-
sultations required under the Cooperation Agreement. In addition,
American firms now have a legal framework in which to negotiate po-
tential lucrative contracts in a sagging nuclear industry.
However, these improvements are not risk free. U.S. cooperation
with the world's second leading communist state could encourage more
U.S. involvement with other communist states. China also could direct
U.S.-supplied nuclear power into military applications in its competi-
tive drive to achieve nuclear parity with the superpowers. Finally, the
financial possibilities are not guaranteed to materialize.15 7
The Tarapur incident lead to the passage of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Act of 1978. The China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
has lead to the introduction of legislation'"8 to avoid compromising
U.S. non-proliferation goals. Future nuclear cooperation agreements
should require unambiguous U.S. consent rights and IAEA safeguards
negotiated and included in the terms of the agreement prior to its sign-
ing and not legislatively rectified post factum in order to demonstrate
and preserve U.S. integrity and dedication to its non-proliferation
policy.
Benjamin M. Chin
157. Construction of ten nuclear power plants was halted because of China's fi-
nancial difficulties. See World Journal, Mar. 29, 1986, at 2 (in Chinese). Furthermore,
China's Vice Premier Li Peng announced that China was curtailing its anticipated
purchases of foreign nuclear equipment and reactors because of shortages in foreign
exchange reserves raising doubts concerning the likelihood of U.S. multibillion-dollar
nuclear sales to China. Southerland, China May Turn to Soviets For Future in Nu-
clear Power, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 1986, at Al. See also supra note 153. China an-
nounced that it was considering the purchase of Soviet nuclear technology but it is
doubtful that the Chinese will purchase the inferior Soviet nuclear technology in light
of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. China stated that it will remain dedicated to pro-
moting its civilian nuclear ambitions, unaffected by the Chernobyl accident. Souther-
land, China to Press on with Nuclear Plans, Wash. Post, May 6, 1986, at A13.
158. See supra note 85.
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APPENDIX A
Agreement for Cooperation Between The Government of the United
States of America and The Government of the People's Republic of
China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
The Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China,
Desiring to establish extensive cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-in-
terference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,
Noting that such cooperation is one between two nuclear weapon
states,
Affirming their support of the objectives of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Affirming their intention to carry out such cooperation on a stable,
reliable and predictable basis,
Mindful that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with
a view to protecting the international environment from radioactive,
chemical and thermal contamination,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Definitions
For the purposes of this agreement:
(1) "parties" means the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(2) "authorized person" means any individual or any entity under
the jurisdiction of either party and authorized by that party to receive,
possess, use, or transfer material, facilities or components;
(3) "person" means any individual or any entity subject to the ju-
risdiction of either party but does not include the parties to this
agreement;
(4) "peaceful purposes" include the use of information, technol-
ogy, material, facilities and components in such fields as research,
power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry but do not in-
clude use in, research specifically on or development of any nuclear
explosive device, or any military purpose;
(5) "material" means source material, special nuclear material or
byproduct material, radioisotopes other than byproduct material, mod-
erator material, or any other such substance so designated by agree-
ment of the parties;
(6) "source material" means (i) uranium, thorium, or any other
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material so designated by agreement of the parties, or (ii) ores contain-
ing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the
parties may agree from time to time;
(7) "special nuclear material" means (i) plutonium, uranium 233,
or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or (ii) any other material so
designated by agreement of the parties;
(8) "byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except
special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to
the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear material;
(9) "moderator material" means heavy water, or graphite or beryl-
lium of a purity suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity
neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, or any other
such material so designated by agreement of the parties;
(10) "high enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty
percent or greater in the isotope 235;
(11) "low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than
twenty percent in the isotope 235;
(12) "facility" means any reactor, other than one designed or used
primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium 233, or any other
item so designated by agreement of the parties;
(13) "reactor" is defined in Annex I, which may be modified by
mutual consent of the parties.
(14) "sensitive nuclear facility" means any plant designed or used
primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, heavy
water production or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium;
(15) "component" means a component part of a facility or other
item, so designated by agreement of the parties;
(16) "major critical component" means any part or. group of parts
essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility;
(17) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (in-
cluding information incorporated in a facility or an important compo-
nent) which is not in the public domain and which is important to the
design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of any sen-
sitive nuclear facility, or such other information so designated by
agreement of the parties.
Article 2
Scope of Cooperation
1. The parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.
Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its re-
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spective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license re-
quirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The parties recognize, with respect to the observance of this agreement,
the principle of international law that provides that a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty.
2. Transfers of information, technology, material, facilities and
components under this agreement may be undertaken directly between
the parties or through authorized persons. Such cooperation shall be
subject to this agreement and to such additional terms and conditions
as may be agreed by the parties.
3. Material, facilities and components will be regarded as having
been transferred pursuant to this agreement only upon receipt of confir-
mation by the supplier party, from the appropriate Government author-
ity of the recipient party, that such material, facilities or components
will be subject to this agreement and that the proposed recipient of
such material, facilities or components, if other than the recipient
party, is an authorized person.
4. Any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear
facilities, or major critical components will, subject to the principles of
this agreement, require additional provisions as an amendment to this
agreement.
Article 3
Transfer of Information and Technology
Information and technology concerning the use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes may be transferred. Transfers of such informa-
tion and technology shall be that which the parties are permitted to
transfer and may be accomplished through various means, including
reports, data banks, computer programs, conferences, visits and assign-
ments of persons to facilities. Fields which may be covered include, but
shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) research, development, experiment, design, construction, oper-
ation, maintenance and use and retirement of reactors and nuclear fuel
fabrication technology;
(2) the use of material in physical and biological research,
medicine, agriculture and industry;
(3) nuclear fuel cycle research, development and industrial appli-
cation to meet civil nuclear needs, including multilateral approaches to
guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for man-
agement of nuclear wastes;
(4) health, safety, environment, and research and development re-
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lated to the foregoing;
(5) assessing the role nuclear power may play in international en-
ergy plans;
(6) codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear energy indus-
try; and
(7) such other fields as may be agreed by the parties.
Article 4
Transfer of Material, Facilities and Components
1. Material, facilities and components may be transferred pursuant
to this agreement for applications consistent with this agreement. Any
special nuclear material to be transferred under this agreement shall be
low enriched uranium except as provided in paragraph 4 of this article.
2. Low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in
reactors and reactor experiments, for conversion or fabrication, or for
such other purposes as may be agreed by the parties.
3. The quantity of special nuclear material transferred under this
agreement shall be the quantity which the parties agree is necessary for
any of the following purposes: the loading of reactors or use in reactor
experiments, the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or
conduct of such reactor experiments, and the accomplishment of such
other purposes as may be agreed by the parties.
4. Small quantities of special nuclear material may be transferred
for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets, radiation sources and
for such other purposes as the parties may agree.
Article 5
Retransfers, Storage, Reprocessing, Enrichment, Alteration, and No
Use for Military Purposes
1. Material, facilities, components or special nuclear material
transferred pursuant to this agreement and any special nuclear mate-
rial produced through the use of such material or facilities may be re-
transferred by the recipient party, except that any such material, facil-
ity, components or special nuclear material shall not be retransferred to
unauthorized persons or, unless the parties agree, beyond its territory.
2. Neither party has any plans to enrich to twenty percent or
greater, reprocess, or alter in form or content material transferred pur-
suant to this agreement or material used in or produced through the
use of any material or facility so transferred. Neither party has any
plans to change locations for storage of plutonium, uranium 233 (ex-
cept as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or high enriched ura-
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nium transferred pursuant to this agreement or used in or produced
through the use of any material or facility so transferred. In the event
that a party would like at some future time to undertake such activi-
ties, the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree on a mutually
acceptable arrangement. The parties undertake the obligation to con-
sider such activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent informa-
tion on th6 plans during the consultations. Inasmuch as any such activi-
ties will be solely for peaceful purposes and will be in accordance with
the provisions of this agreement, the parties will consult immediately
and will seek agreement within six months on long-term arrangements
for such activities. In the spirit of cooperation the parties agree not to
act within that period of time. If such an arrangement is not agreed
upon within that period of time, the parties will promptly consult for
the purpose of agreeing on measures which they consider to be consis-
tent with the provisions of the agreement in order to undertake such
activities on an interim basis. The parties agree to refrain from actions
which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangements
for undertaking such activities or adversely affect cooperation under
this agreement. The parties agree that the consultations referred to
above will be carried out promptly and mutual agreement reached in a
manner to avoid hampering, delay or undue interference in their re-
spective nuclear programs. Neither party will seek to gain commercial
advantage. Nothing in this article shall be used by either party to in-
hibit the legitimate development and exploitation of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes in accordance with this agreement.
3. Material, facilities or components transferred pursuant to this
agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any
material, facility or components so transferred shall not be used for any
nuclear explosive device, for research specifically on or development of
any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.
Article 6
Physical Security
1. Each party shall maintain adequate physical security with re-
spect to any material, facility or components transferred pursuant to
this agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in
or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred.
2. The parties agree to the levels for the application of physical
security set forth in Annex II, which levels may be modified by mutual
consent of the parties. The parties shall maintain adequate physical se-
curity measures in accordance with such levels. These measures, as
minimum protection measures, shall be comparable to the recommen-
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dations set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Revision 1 enti-
tled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material", or in any revision
of that document agreed to by the parties.
3. The parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding
the adequacy of physical security measures maintained pursuant to this
article.
4. Each party shall identify those agencies or authorities responsi-
ble for ensuring that levels of physical security are adequately met and
having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations
in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this
article. Each party shall also designate points of contact within its na-
tional authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transporta-
tion and other physical security matters of mutual concern.
Article 7
Cessation of Cooperation
1. Each party shall endeavor to avoid taking any actions that af-
fect cooperation under this agreement. If either party at any time fol-
lowing entry into force of this agreement does not comply with the pro-
visions of this agreement, the parties shall promptly hold consultations
on the problem, it being understood that the other party shall have the
right to cease further cooperation under this agreement.
2. If either party decides to cease further cooperation under this
agreement, the parties shall make appropriate arrangements as may be
required.
Article 8
Consultations
1. The parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding
the implementation of this agreement, the development of further coop-
eration in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and other mat-
ters of mutual concern.
2. The parties recognize that this cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy is between two nuclear-weapon states and that bilat-
eral safeguards are not required. In order to exchange experience,
strengthen technical cooperation between the parties, ensure that the
provisions of this agreement are effectively carried out, and enhance a
stable, reliable, and predictable nuclear cooperation relationship, in
connection with transfers of material, facilities and components under
this agreement the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mu-
tually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits
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to material, facilities and components subject to this agreement.
3. The parties shall exchange views and information on the estab-
lishment and operation of their respective national accounting and con-
trol systems for source and special nuclear material subject to this
agreement.
Article 9
Environmental Protection
The parties shall consult, with regard to activities under this
agreement, to identify the international environmental implications
arising from such activities and shall cooperate in protecting the inter-
national environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamina-
tion arising from peaceful nuclear cooperation under this agreement
and in related matters of health and safety.
Article 10
Entry Into Force and Duration
1. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of mutual no-
tifications of the completion of legal procedures by the parties and shall
remain in force for a period of thirty years. This term may be extended
by agreement of the parties in accordance with their respective applica-
ble procedures.
2. Notwithstanding the suspension, termination or expiration of
this agreement or any cooperation hereunder for any reason, the provi-
sions of articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue in effect so long as any
material, facility or components subject to these articles remain in the
territory of the party concerned or any material, facility or components
subject to these articles remain subject to that party's right to exercise
jurisdiction or to direct disposition elsewhere.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized,
have signed this agreement.
DONE at Washington this 23rd day of July, 1985, in English and Chi-
nese, both equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE PEOPLE'S
OF AMERICA: REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1986]
356 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 10
Annex I - Definition of "Reactor"
"Reactor" means:
1. any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is
maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium or thorium, or any
combination thereof; or
2. any of the following major parts of an apparatus described in
paragraph 1:
(1) a pressure vessel designed to contain the core;
(2) primary collant pumps;
(3) fuel charging or discharging machines;
(4) control rods.
A "reactor" does not include the steam turbine generator portion of a
nuclear power plant.
Annex II
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 6, the agreed levels of physical
security to be ensured by the competent national authorities in the use,
storage and transportation of the materials listed in the attached table
shall as a minimum include protection characteristics as below.
Category III
Use and storage within an area to which access is controlled.
Transportation under special precautions including prior arrange-
ments among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement be-
tween entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and
recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport specify-
ing time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.
Category II
Use and storage within a protected area to which access is con-
trolled, i.e., an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic
devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of
points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an
equivalent level of physical protection.
Transportation under special precautions including prior arrange-
ments among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement be-
tween entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and
recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport, specify-
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ing time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.
Category I
Material in this category shall be protected with highly reliable
systems against unauthorized uses as follows:
Use and storage within a highly protected area, i.e., a protected
area as defined for category II above, to which, in addition, access is
restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined, and
which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication
with appropraite response forces. Specific measures taken in this con-
text should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any
assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.
Transportation under special precautions as identified above for
transportation of categories II and III materials and, in addition, under
constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure
close communication with appropraite response forces.
Agreed Minute
During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation between
the United States of America and the People's Republic of China Con-
cerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy signed today, the following
understanding, which shall be an integral part of the agreement, was
reached.
The parties agree that the interpretation and implementation of
article 5(3) shall not involve any nuclear activities and related research
and development carried out by either party, as a nuclear weapon state,
through the use of material, facilities, components and technology not
subject to the agreement.
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APPENDIX B
CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY
CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTS
Yield
20KT
40KT
300KT
30KT
500KT
3MT
Delivery System
Ground (tower)
Air (TU-4)
Air (TU-16)
Missile (SS-4
IRBM)
Ground (tower)
Air (TU-16)
7. 12/24/67 25KT Air (TU-16)
8. 12/27/68 3MT Air (TU-16)
9. 9/22/69 25KT Underground
10. 9/29/69 3MT Air (TU-16)
11. 10/14/70 3MT Air (TU-16)
11/18/71 20KT
1/07/72 Under
20KT
3/18/72 200KT
6/27/73 2MT+
6/17/74 500MT
10/27/75 200KT
1/23/76 200KT
9/26/76 200KT
10/17/76 200KT
11/17/76 4MT
9/17/77 20KT
3/15/78 20KT
10/14/78 50KT
12/14/78 20KT
10/16/80 IMT
Ground (tower)
Ground (tower)
Air (TU-16)
Air (TU-16)
Air (TU-16)
Underground
Air (TU-16)
Air (TU-16)
Underground
Air (TU-16)
Air (TU-16)
Ground (tower)
Underground
Air (TU-16)
Air (TU-16)
Text Site
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Shwangchentze
to Lop Nor
Warhead
Fission device
Fission
Fission
Fission
Date
10/16/64
5/14/65
5/09/66
10/27/66
12/28/66
6/17/67
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
Lop Nor
N.A.
Tactical weapon
Tactical weapon
Thermonuclear
warhead
Fission
Fission
Fission
Tactical weapon
Thermonuclear
warhead
Sources: Ray bonds (ed.), The Chinese War Machine (New York: Crescent, 1979), p. 174;
Agatha S.Y. Wong-Fraser, "China's Nuclear Deterrent," Current History, September
1981,p. 246;
Stockholm International Peace Research International Yearbook 1981, pp. 374, 382.
This chart was taken from Shao-Chuan Leng, China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View, Occa-
sional Papers/Reprints Series in Asian Studies, No.1 (1984) 60, p. 15.
1986]
Lop Nor Fission
Lop Nor Thermonuclear
warhead
Lop Nor N.A.
Lop Nor Thermonuclear
warhead
Lop Nor Fission device
Lop Nor Thermonuclear
warhead
Lop Nor Thermonuclear
warhead
Lop Nor Tactical warhead
Nop Nor Tactical warhead
Lop Nor Atomic warhead
Lop Nor Thermonuclear
warhead
Lop Nor Tactical weapon
Lon Nor Fission
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APPENDIX C
Nuclear Policy Decisionmaking Organization
State Party
National Peoples Congress u P CCP Central Commicy.
CNPC Standng Comittee -
S ta te C e n tra l  
Polc7 MiiartyC
Cororato a) Fe ilitary Commission oitn
Isca ioabnd Technology )arState C uncilU processing
d)tSa fey 
)RserhndvlonIS're ~ Sat PSnnnnng I :. C.. State Ec....mic CommissionI
ITeScienceh I/n tehnoog
Nu Nuceapwe
clea Nomisoca hs
| Pannng f~cl/ISafety I
I . I/ I AdministrationI
National D f in
SScience Tchnology
h)my of Bcei s and Itndustry CoNeE.nan
MinSoothyWest lstte fRatrEgncigadDsg
Min y od Ministry ofWe Miistry of ns Ministry of
Eletronics twater Co i.t Nuclear ai n disty I Ma hine Building ie
e
ati
SO E O ovncy and
Elecric owerUniformed Military Establishment
[ChineseAssociationos ..... ra d~cnoy: Srle~p'' .. ~a,1 .. Po,,,ical,,.pt iona S aff Det
Chinese Nuclear Society J
I
Nuclear Policy Implementation
I Star° C°nc I
Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of L J Minitry ofof
Nuclear Industry " W trConservancy "" National Defense ElecachieoBuldin
aand Electric Power , d.B
Chinese Association
of Science and Technology "I
ChieseNucearSocety1-
China Nucl"~e ar sr Civilian Offices Military Offices
Corporation a) Fuel cycle a) Enrighment/
a) Foreign b) Uranium reprocessing
negotiating geology b) Warhead production
partner c) Construction c) Propulsion
d) Safety d) Research and development
.) Foreign affairs
f) Science and technology
-Reactor research
-Nuclear power
-Nuclear physics
-Institution.]
b) Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering
c) South West Institute of Reactor Engineering and Design
d) South West Institute of Physics
aReprm~nts the most important nuclear affairs dlecisionmaking organizations.
SOURCE: Offce or Technology Assessment.
